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NCORPORATION planning is the process of ascertaining the facts re-
garding a proposed business venture and then transforming those facts
into a sound and workable plan of incorporation. The client who comes to
the attorney wishing to incorporate has seldom developed any ideas as to the
form or structure the business should have, as he is generally much more
concerned with the attraction of capital and development of operating
goals. It is the role of the attorney to take these goals and the available
resources and mold the corporation to fit the particular needs of his client.
One aspect of this task that is perhaps the most difficult is the apportion-
ment of ownership, risk and control among the participants. In the overall
planning of the corporation the lawyer has a myriad of tools at his dis-
posal, including the articles of incorporation, bylaws, minutes of the or-
ganizational meeting, stock certificates, shareholder agreements, buy-sell
agreements, and employment agreements. All too often lawyers, in draft-
ing these instruments, rely upon form-book "boiler plate" and fail to in-
dividually tailor them to meet the needs of their clients. But corporations,
like individuals, have differing needs and desires. It is the purpose of this
Article to present the various aspects of Texas corporation laws which
should be considered by the attorney when incorporating a business in
Texas.
I. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION AND BYLAWS
The articles of incorporation (often referred to as the charter) and the
bylaws of the corporation constitute the two major corporate documents.
Great diversity of opinion exists regarding what items should be included
within which document and the amount of detail to be included within
each.' Thus arises the importance in proper incorporation planning, for the
draftsman to understand the major distinctions between the articles of in-
corporation and the bylaws.
1The content of the charter is now a matter largely codified by statute; however, this is not
true of the bylaws. See TEX. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 3.02, as amended, (Supp. 1968) (charter),
and id. art. 2.23 (1956) (bylaws).
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A corporate charter is often described as a threefold contract (a) be-
tween the state and the corporation, (b) between the corporation and its
shareholders, and (c) among the shareholders inter se.' Accordingly, char-
ter provisions are binding upon all inter- and intra-corporate matters. Be-
cause of the tripartite nature of this relationship, the articles of incorpora-
tion can be said to consist of not only the specific clauses contained therein
but also the laws applicable thereto.' There is constitutional and statutory
authority in every state which must be read into the charter of a modern
corporation, thus qualifying the language of the document.4 With respect
to matters neither superimposed by the federal or state constitutions nor
by state statutes, the charter is considered the fundamental and organic
law of the corporation.' Although the United States Supreme Court very
early established that the charter of a corporation is a contract entitled
to the protection afforded by article I, section 10 of the Constitution,
which prohibits the states from passing any law impairing the obligations
of contracts, this guaranty has in later years been held not to prevent sub-
sequent changes in corporate laws from having binding effect upon ex-
isting corporations!
A bylaw, on the other hand, may be defined as a rule for governing
the internal affairs of the corporation, arising from an agreement or con-
tract between the corporation and its members to conduct the corporate
business in a particular manner.! Its function is to prescribe the rights and
duties of the shareholders with reference to the internal government of the
corporation, management of corporate affairs, and the rights and duties
of officers, employees, agents, and other members of the corporation inter
se.8 Thus, the bylaws are not in the nature of legislative enactments; they
are, rather, regulations of the corporation regarding the control and man-
agement of its affairs, binding only upon intra-corporate matters, and ma-
terially differing from the charter.! If not in contravention of any con-
stitutional, statutory, or charter provision, the bylaws are a contract be-
tween the corporation and its members and among the members them-
'See Personal Indus. Bankers v. Citizens Budget Co., 80 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1935); Western
Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 403 Il. 260, 85 N.E.2d 722 (1949); Opdyke v. Security Sav. & Loan Co.,
157 Ohio 121, 105 N.E.2d 9 (1952).
a See Oregon Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Oregonian Ry., 130 U.S. 1 (1888); Arkansas Stave Co.
v. State, 94 Ark. 27, 125 S.W. 1001 (1910); Kreicker v. Naylor Pipe Co., 374 Ill. 364, 29 N.E.2d
502 (1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 659 (1941); Sanderson v. Salmon River Canal Co., 45 Idaho 244, 263
P. 32 (1927); Westport Stone Co. v. Thomas, 175 Ind. 319, 94 N.E. 406 (1911); State ex rel.
Swanson v. Perham, 30 Wash. 2d 368, 191 P.2d 689 (1948); Milwaukee Sanitarium v. Swift, 238
Wis. 628, 300 N.W. 760 (1941).4 Shaw v. Lone Star Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 123 Tex. 373, 71 S.W.2d 863 (1934). The corollary
is that the powers, privileges, and immunities specified in the legislative act authorizing organization
of a corporation cannot be added to or enlarged by the charter or other instruments. A.B. Frank Co.
v. Latham, 145 Tex. 30, 193 S.W.2d 671 (1946).
SSee, e.g., Trico Elec. Co-op. v. Ralston, 67 Ariz. 358, 196 P.2d 470 (1948).
6Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). See generally 2 B.
SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES-THE RIGHTS OF
PROPERTY 301-04 (1965), where the author states that the practical impact of the Dartmouth case
has been all but eliminated.
"St. Regis Candies v. Hovas, 8 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
a See, e.g., Wells v. Black, 117 Cal. 157, 48 P. 1090 (1897); Voorheis v. Walker, 227 Mich.
291, 198 N.W. 994 (1924); Diedrick v. Helm, 217 Minn. 483, 14 N.W.2d 913 (1944); Colcord
v. Granzow, 137 Okla. 194, 278 P. 654 (1928).9 See Dempster Mfg. Co. v. Downs, 126 Iowa 80, 101 N.W. 735 (1904).
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selves, but not necessarily between the state and the corporation, as is true
of the charter. °
In Texas the charter and bylaws also differ regarding the manner in
which the documents are handled by the corporation pursuant to state law.
The articles of incorporation are prepared for filing with the Secretary of
State, and the document does not become operative until accepted by the
Secretary.11 Once filed and accepted, the articles of incorporation become
a matter of public record open for inspection. When the corporation has
begun business, the articles may be changed by amendment only upon the
approval of the holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares
entitled to vote thereon"2 and the subsequent filing of the amended articles
with the Secretary of State.'" The bylaws, however, with one excep-
tion, are neither subject to administrative scrutiny nor a matter of public
record, and are usually more easily amended by a majority vote of the
shareholders, or by the directors if they have been delegated this power."
The draftsman should realize that the corporate charter is more akin
to a legislative enactment, more public in nature, and less subject to change
than the corporate bylaws. With this in mind, the draftsman must strive
to keep his client within the bounds of the applicable law by assisting him
in determining whether a particular provision should be placed in the char-
ter, the bylaws, or some other corporate instrument, or whether the provi-
sion should be omitted from the corporate instruments altogether.
II. DRAFTING THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
A. Contents Generally Required by Statute
Incorporation under the laws of Texas is a relatively simple procedure
available to anyone having the money to pay the $100 filing fee and the
attorney's fees. A corporation may not commence business, however, until
it has received for the issuance of its shares at least $1,000 in money paid,
labor done, or property actually received. Three or more natural persons,
of whom two are citizens of Texas and all are twenty-one years of age or
more, may incorporate a business by filing articles of incorporation with
the Secretary of State." Such articles are required to state only (1) the
name of the corporation, (2) the period of its duration, (3) the purpose
of its organization, (4) the aggregate number of shares authorized and
their par value, if any, (5) that the corporation will not commence busi-
ness until it has received for the issuance of its shares at least $1,000 in
money paid, labor done, or property actually received, (6) the name of
the initial registered agent and the address of the initial registered office,
"See, e.g., Knight v. Shutz, 141 Ohio 267, 47 N.E.2d 886 (1943); Bechtold v. Coleman Realty
Co., 367 Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661 (1951).
"See TEX. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. arts. 3.03, 3.04 (1956).
"Id. art. 4.02A(3).
"Id. art. 4.05.
14 See Id. art. 2.23. Appropriate parts of the bylaws may, however, be filed for record under
id. art. 2.19F when there are restrictions on transferability of shares, or the shares are subject to a
buy-sell agreement.
"TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 3.01 (1956). Id. art. 1.02A(3) defines the articles of in-
corporation as "the original or restated Articles of incorporation and all amendments thereto."
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(7) the number of the initial directors and their names and addresses,
and (8) the names and addresses of the incorporators, plus a recitation
that all are twenty-one or over and that two are citizens of Texas." Al-
though the Act clearly prescribes the mandatory contents of the charter
and these formal requirements appear to be simple, approximately twenty
per cent of the 12,000 charters filed annually with the Secretary of State's
office are returned for corrections. 7 Some of these mistakes are as obvious
as the omission of a notary seal, failure of the incorporators to sign both
the original and duplicate articles, or referring to the corporation by two
different names in the articles (e.g., as "Inc." and also as "Incorporated").
Many of these errors can be easily avoided by the attorney if he will just
recheck the instrument before mailing it to the Secretary. The following
comments are designed to give a more detailed discussion of each of the
mandatory provisions of the articles of incorporation.
Name. The first item required by article 3.02A of the Texas Business Cor-
poration Act (hereafter referred to as the TBCA) to be stated within
the articles of incorporation is the corporate name. The use of just any
name is not permitted. The chosen corporate name must meet three spe-
cific requirements of article 2.05 of the TBCA. First, the name must con-
tain the word "corporation," "company," "incorporated," or an abbrevia-
tion thereof."6 Secondly, the name must not contain any word or phrase
indicating or implying that the corporation is organized for any purpose
other than the purpose or purposes stated in its articles of incorporation.
And finally, the name must not be the same as, or deceptively similar to,
the name of any existing Texas corporation or foreign corporation author-
ized to do business in Texas, or a name which has been appropriately re-
served or registered by another corporation under articles 2.06 or 2.07 of
the TBCA.
After the client and his attorney have chosen a particular corporate
name, the attorney should clear the name with the Secretary of State's
office before filing the articles of incorporation. The attorney may do this
by telephoning the Secretary of State's office and filing the articles of in-
corporation soon thereafter, or by making application to the Secretary of
State for a reservation of the corporate name. If the latter approach is
chosen and if the Secretary determines that the name is not the same as,
or deceptively similar to, one which is already being used or which is under
reservation or registration, he will reserve the use of the requested corporate
name for a period of 120 days, computed from the date the Secretary issues
the certificate of reservation." Thus, by reserving the name, the attorney
has 120 days in which to file the articles of incorporation with the assurance
" TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 3.02, as amended, (Supp. 1968).
" Lecture by Ivon Lee, Legal Counsel, Office of the Secretary of State, presented at Southern
Methodist University School of Law, Mar. 2, 1968.
18 As an accommodation to the British Commonwealth countries, if the firm is a foreign cor-
poration, the name may contain the word "limited" or "ltd." TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
8.03 (1956).
19 Id. art. 2.06. The fee for this service is $10.00. Id. art. 10.01A(8), as amended, (Supp.
1969) (effective Sept. 1, 1969).
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that the articles will not be rejected because of an invalid corporate name.
As a practical matter, the attorney should at least clear the corporate name
with the Secretary of State's office by telephone before filing the articles of
incorporation.
In determining the availability of a corporate name, the Secretary of
State simply disregards the words "corporation," "company," "incorpo-
rated," or the abbreviations thereof, and simple article adjectives such as
"the." The Secretary is interested only in the substance of the name itself.
Thus, if the client wants to use "ABC, Incorporated," and there is cur-
rently in existence a company called "The ABC Company," the desired
name is unavailable. On the other hand, if the client adds a number of
words to the particular name, he may be granted permission to use it.
For example, if "ABC Company" already exists, and the client wants to
use the name "ABC Enterprises, Inc." or "ABC Industries" or "ABC
Development Company," the desired name will be available. There are in-
stances in which a desired name, although not identical or deceptively
similar, will be so close to the name of an existing corporation that a
great likelihood of infringement exists. In these circumstances, the Sec-
retary of State may require a letter of consent from the existing corpora-
tion before clearing the desired name." A group of related corporations
will frequently have similar names which the Secretary of State will per-
mit upon the filing of appropriate letters of consent.
As a final suggestion, the attorney should use the exact same style of
the approved corporate name throughout the articles of incorporation and
any other corporate documents filed on behalf of the corporation; other-
wise, the articles or subsequent documents may be rejected by the Secre-
tary of State.
Duration. The next mandatory item to be placed in the articles of incorpo-
ration is the duration of corporate existence. Article 3.02A(2) of the
TBCA permits perpetual duration of a corporation and, except in most un-
usual circumstances, the duration of the corporation should be stated as
perpetual. A few attorneys continue to file articles of incorporation speci-
fying a fifty-year life, a holdover from the former law limiting the maxi-
mum term of corporate existence to fifty years.2 ' Such a limitation may
result in the inadvertent expiration of the client's corporation. Of course,
there is nothing illegal in specifying a limited duration for the corporation,
but this limitation should be carefully studied by the attorney before
using it in the articles of incorporation. Almost all corporate charters filed
in Texas currently provide for perpetual duration."
Purpose. Perhaps no other mandatory item of the articles of incorporation
is more difficult to draft properly than the purpose clause. Since most
20 See id. art. 2.05A(3) (1956).
21 Statistics from the Texas Secretary of State's office show that out of a sample of 1,000 charters
filed in 1968, some 989 (or 98.9%) provided that the corporate duration was to be perpetual,
whereas only 11 (or 1.1%) contained a 50-year duration clause.
2 Id.
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clients, practically speaking, prefer corporate documents that "really say
something," the attorney is often faced with the problem of determining
whether the purpose clause should be general and brief, or specific and
detailed. There is no unity of opinion about drafting this clause, and quite
valid reasons are advanced for a simple statement of broad purposes," a de-
tailed enumeration of explicit purposes,24 or a compromise between the
tWo."5
Under pre-TBCA law a corporation could not be organized for multiple
purposes." The enactment of the TBCA in 1955 introduced the multiple-
purpose approach by permitting a corporation to be organized "for any
lawful purpose or purposes" provided such purpose or purposes were "fully
stated in the articles of incorporation."" Inspired by this statutory revolu-
tion, many attorneys began to list page after page of corporate purposes.
However, this tendency has changed with the realization that the more
one lists, the more he restricts. Today, the trend in Texas is toward a short
purpose clause consisting of perhaps no more than a single paragraph."
Even though Texas has abandoned its former single-purpose position, a
careful reading of all the provisions of TBCA article 2.01 reveals that
there are a number of purposes for which a corporation cannot be organ-
ized under the TBCA; these situations are controlled instead by special
statutes.2
While brief purpose clauses are permissible, Texas has not yet become as
liberal as some other states. For example, under a recent 1967 amendment,
Delaware permits a purpose clause stating that the purpose of the corpora-
tion is "to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations
may be organized under the General Corporation Law of Delaware."'"
23 The American Bar Association suggests that good practice entails a statement of corporate
purposes in simple terms, apparently on the theory that such terms allow broad interpretation.
Draftsmen favoring the brief, general statement believe that the generality of the broad purpose
clause is hindered by the cataloguing of detailed explicit statements of purpose. K. PANTZER & R.
DEER, THE DRAFTING OF CORPORATE CHARTERS AND BYLAWS 35 (1968). Professor Ballantine
gives three reasons why a broad purpose clause might be desirable: "1. to give a wide discretion and
authority to the directors as to the scope of the business, 2. to assure the validity of contracts
against a plea of ultra vires [of less utility today], 3. to protect directors against possible liability for
exceeding their authority." H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 222 (1946).
24 Professor Lattin argues that the better practice in drafting the purpose clause is to include
"only those purposes which are presently intended to be within the area of the particular business
and those which may reasonably be indicated in the foreseeable future." N. LATTIN, CORPORATIONS
179 (1959) (emphasis added).
2"A compromise position is taken by Professor Henn when he notes that the purpose clause
"should express the nature and scope of the business and risk as agreed upon among the share-
holders. Therefore, the .. . clause . .. should be so drafted as to be definite enough to curb
excursions into unauthorized ventures and yet sufficiently general to permit reasonable operations
and expansion without the necessity of future amendment of the articles of incorporation." H.
HENN, CORPORATIONS 159-60 (1961).
26 See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302 (individual sections of this article were enacted
at different times but the entire article was repealed by the Texas Business Corporation Act).
'TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.01A (1956).
2 For example, statistics from the Texas Secretary of State's office show that out of a sample
of 1,000 charters filed in 1968, some 514 (or 51.4%) contained a one-paragraph purpose clause,
some 114 (or 11.4%) contained a two-paragraph purpose clause, some 249 (or 24.9%) contained
a five-paragraph purpose clause, and some 59 (or 5.9%) contained a ten-paragraph purpose clause.
29 Examples of businesses which may not be organized under the Texas Business Corporation
Act include non-profit institutions, banks, trust companies, building and loan associations, insurance
companies, railroad companies, cemetery companies, cooperatives, labor unions, abstract and title
insurance companies. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.01B(4) (1956).
S0 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a) (3), as amended, (1967). One commentator is highly im-
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This would not be a fully stated purpose in Texas. However, one rec-
ommended clause for a broad, fully stated purpose under the TBCA, and
one acceptable to the Secretary of State's office, is: "To buy, sell, lease, and
deal in services, personal property, and real property subject to Part Four
of the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act."'" This concise phrase
includes most conceivable corporate activities, such as manufacturing,
franchising, purchasing stock in other corporations, and, in addition, avoids
the pitfalls of overstatement which usually result in the inclusion of pur-
poses prohibited under the TBCA.
Authorized Shares. The concept of share authorization involves only one
segment in planning the capital structure of the corporation. The proper
approach of capital structure planning should be to consider the task in
broad perspective-planning the entire financial goals of the business or-
ganization, including consideration of the main objectives of the division
of profit and control. In attaining these objectives, the draftsman may
utilize one or more classes of stock, provide for multiple types of debt,
issue preferred stock in series, and have prescribed stockholders partici-
pating either on a half-equity (stock) and half-debt (bonds) basis or on a
no-debt basis. These and many more alternatives are viable under the
flexible language of the TBCA since there are few significant statutory
limitations regarding corporate capitalization in the Act.
The articles of incorporation must state the aggregate number of shares
authorized, their classification and par value, if any, and their preferences,
limitations, and other relative rights, if applicable." Corporate shares can
exist only pursuant to the authorization of the corporation, and this au-
thorization must be expressed in the articles of incorporation." If there
is more than one class of stock, the provisions relative thereto "must be
repeated in full or in summary form on the stock certificates, but their
authority comes only from their statement in the articles."' However,
corporate debt, regardless of what form it takes, does not have to be
authorized in the articles.
The TBCA contains no limitation on the number of shares that may
be authorized in the articles of incorporation." Yet corporate draftsmen
should be aware of the fact that the office of the Secretary of State requires
pressed with the new Delaware provision, for, as he sees it, "the certificate need no longer recite in
tedious detail all conceivable types of business which a corporation might wish to undertake at some
future date . . . [and] the corporation, by including an 'all-purpose' statement, enables its directors
to pursue some new business activity without having to secure an amendment of the certificate or
otherwise to determine that the new business is within the corporate powers." E. FOLK, THE NEW
DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 2 (1967).
" Lecture by Iron Lee, Legal Counsel, Office of the Secretary of State, presented at Southern
Methodist University School of Law, Mar. 2, 1968, See generally Lake, Corporate Name and Purpose
Clauses Under Texas Corporation Act, 23 TEX. B.J. 827 (1960).
32 TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 3.02A(4), as amended, (Supp. 1968).
" Id. These provisions relating to the capital stock of the corporation may be repeated in the
bylaws.
" Campbell, The Drafting of Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws- Under the Texas Business
Corporation Act, Proceedings, Texas Business Corporation Act Institute, 3A TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. 576, 582 (1956) (emphasis added). See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.19B (1956)..
" The TBCA simply authorizes the corporation to issue the number of shares expressed in the
articles. Trx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.12A (1956).
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that if par stock is utilized, the aggregate value of the stock authorized
by the articles of incorporation must be at least $1,000 (i.e., the number
of authorized shares x par value= $1,000 or more) ° This formal re-
quirement can be met by simply authorizing a sufficient number of shares
so that the par value of the authorized shares equals the necessary $1,000,
regardless of whether the corporation intends to issue all of the authorized
shares. For example, the office of the Secretary of State would not approve
a charter which authorized 1,000 shares of 100 par value stock even if the
stock were sold at $10 per share (1,000 authorized shares x $.10 = $100).
To secure the Secretary's approval, however, all the draftsman need do is
to increase the number of authorized shares to 10,000, which would then
provide the corporation with a total authorized capital of $1,000 (10,000
authorized shares x $.10 par value= $1,000). The only disadvantage to
this procedure may lie in the fact that the corporation will have authorized
but unissued shares which subsequently can be issued at will by the board
of directors, subject to possible preemptive rights of the existing sharehold-
ers.
Many attorneys consider it advisable to authorize somewhat more shares
than are intended to be issued originally. This practice of having authorized
but unissued shares eliminates the burdensome necessity of amending the
articles of incorporation to provide additional shares when needed (i.e.,
for new shareholders or for stock splits). However, since some states im-
pose a tax on authorized rather than issued shares, the practice of having
an excess of authorized shares could impose an unnecessary expense on the
Texas corporation when qualifying to do business in these states.
Consideration. The issuance of shares raises the question of the nature and
sufficiency of the consideration for which the shares may be issued. The
problem of determining what constitutes "consideration" in the Texas
corporate context is not strictly one of draftsmanship, but rather of sub-
stantive law. Yet some understanding of the term is a requisite to proper
corporate% planning and drafting of corporate documents. Generally, the
problem of consideration involves two basic questions: (1) What consti-
tutes sufficient consideration? (2) What is the value of the consideration
received?
Regarding the first question of sufficient consideration, article 2.16 of
the TBCA, which parallels article 12, section 6 of the Texas Constitution,
provides that "the consideration paid for the issuance of shares shall con-
sist of money paid, labor done or property actually received,"" and
"[n]either promissory notes nor the promise of future services shall con-
stitute payment or part payment for shares of a corporation. '"" The Texas
" The authority for this requirement is derived from id. art. 4.12E which provides that the
stated capital may not be reduced below $i,000.
"TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 2.16A (1956) (emphasis added).
8Id. art. 2.16B. This requirement, which is similar to that found in most state corporate laws,
comes from the TEx. CONST. art. 12, 5 6. The constitutional provision was said to be a guaranty
against "watered stock," that is, stock which purports to be paid for in full, but which in fact has
pot been paid for. It was orisinally added to the Constitution in response to the Credit Mobilier
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courts have construed the provisions of article 2.16A of the TBCA liter-
ally. Thus, "property" means property capable of being readily applied to
the debts of the corporation." Whereas an unpatented formula is not
"property," '4  a patent is.4' By careful planning, property can probably be
created by transforming ideas or processes, which are not good considera-
tion under Texas law, into written manuals or programs. Also, a trade
name or application pending on a patent or trademark would constitute
good consideration. In addition, "property" includes contract rights trans-
ferred to the corporation,- as well as an oil and gas lease in a partially
proven territory." Further, before shares can be issued the full amount of
consideration must have been paid to the corporation." Once this is done
the shareholder is under no further obligation to the corporation or its
creditors with respect to such shares.' As a practical matter it is advisable
to document the receipt of consideration by a special receipt reciting that
it is for shares, or, as is more commonly done, by appropriate recitation
in the minutes.
In resolving the second question of the value of the consideration re-
ceived there are two basic tests. The "true value" test requires that the
value of the consideration received equal the indicated value of the stock
issued therefor. This test is uncompromisingly harsh in application because
it is often very difficult to value consideration that is received in forms
other than cash. Furthermore, the test really offers no assistance to those
persons in the corporation who have the responsibility of valuing such con-
sideration. On the other hand, the "good faith" test allows the board of
directors to value the consideration received, for example, in the form of
property, and that value will be conclusive in the absence of fraud. Texas
follows the "good faith" test; thus valuation of consideration by the proper
person having such responsibility is conclusive in the absence of fraud."
Substantial authority exists in Texas to the effect that TBCA article
2.16C is likewise subject to literal interpretations; thus, a declaration by
the board of directors regarding the valuation of consideration is pre-
sumed valid in the absence of fraud." In fact, the courts have not shown
scandal of 1872. 2 Tsx. CONST. ANN. 712 (1955). See generally Champion v. Commissioner, 303
F.2d 887 (sth Cir. 1962).
Although, broadly speaking, a promissory note is "property," the Texas supreme court very
early set forth the rationale as to why such a note was not valid "consideration" for the issuance of
shares. The integrity of a corporation and the interests of the public demand that the assets of the
corporation consist of something more than its stockholders' debts; thus, the corporation cannot
accept a subscriber's note in payment for his stock. Washer v. Smyer, 109 Tex. 398, 211 S.W. 985
(1919). See also Langdeau v. Dick, 356 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), error ref. n.r.e. (hold-
ing that notes secured by a deed of trust on real property covering the purchase of debenture bonds
issued by an insurance company were "property").
"'Woodson v. McAllister, 119 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 314 U.S.
703 (1941); Washer v. Smyer, 109 Tex. 398, 211 S.W. 985 (1919).
40 O'Bear-Nester Glass Co. v. Anti-Explo Co., 101 Tex. 431, 108 S.W. 967 (1908).
4' Atlas Trailers & Water Mufflers, Inc. v. McCallum, 118 Tex. 173, 12 S.W.2d 957 (1929).
' General Bonding & Cas. Ins, Co. v. Moseley, 110 Tex. 529, 222 S.W. 961 (1920).
4
aMcAlister v. Eclipse Oil Co., 128 Tex. 449, 98 S.W.2d 171 (1936).
44TEX. Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. art. 2.16A (1956).
Id. art. 2.21A.
48Id. art. 2.16C provides: "In the absence of fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the
board of directors or the shareholders, as the case may be, as to the value of the consideration re-
ceived for shares shall be conclusive."
"' Sandor Petroleum Corp. v. Williams, 321 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), error ref. n.r.e.;
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any great willingness to question this presumption, and will do so only
where there is a clear abuse of discretion by the board of directors." How-
ever, in United Steel Industries, Inc. v. Manhart"' the court failed to give
presumptive effect to the board of directors' valuation of the consideration.
This result was at least unusual, if not unwarranted, because the board had
given written approval of the issuance of stock for "services." Admittedly,
the apparent arrangement was to issue stock for services performed, or to
be performed, during the first year of corporate existence. However, at the
time the stock was issued, some, but not all, of the agreed services had
been performed on behalf of the corporation, and at the trial there was
substantial disagreement as to the nature, adequacy and valuation of the
performed services as consideration. Although TBCA article 2.16C speaks
of the conclusiveness of the directors' judgment regarding the value of
consideration received, the court undauntedly stated: "The judgment of
the board of directors 'as to the value of consideration received for
shares' is conclusive, but such does not authorize the board to issue shares
contrary to the Constitution, for services to be performed in the future...
or for property not received . . . ." Although in Manhart part of one
shareholder's stock had been issued for past services, the court affirmed the
cancellation of all of his stock, refusing to apportion between stock issued
for past services and stock issued for future services. Thus, the meaning
and effect of the rather clear wording of article 2.16C has been somewhat
clouded by the Manhart decision. The holding gives too restrictive an in-
terpretation of the "good faith" test, and perhaps spells future trouble in
this area of corporate law.
The general problem of the value of consideration can, to some extent,
be alleviated by careful planning. If the situation is desperate, a corpora-
tion could always make a salary advance to a prospective shareholder-
employee or place a value upon his pre-incorporation services, which
amount could then be used as consideration to purchase stock, although
this would probably constitute taxable income to the shareholder-em-
ployee. Another possibility would be a loan from the other shareholders to
the shareholder lacking adequate funds, or third party secured notes would
be appropriate consideration for stock even though the shareholder's own
unsecured note would not.
If only one of the prospective shareholders intends to contribute doubt-
ful consideration, the problem can be handled by having that shareholder
contribute an additional amount of valid consideration, preferably cash.
Professor Herwitz suggests that consideration for issued stock involving
$500 cash plus doubtful consideration from one shareholder and $50,000
cash from another shareholder would be perfectly acceptable even though
Smith v. Ideal Laundry Co., 286 S.W. 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), error dismissed; Peden Iron &
Steel Co. v. Jenkins, 203 S.W. 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918), error ref. See also Coit v. North Caro-
lina Gold Amalgamating Co., 119 U.S. 343 (1886); Elward v. Peabody Coal Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d
234, 132 N.E.2d 549 (1956).
" See cases cited in note 47 ssipra.
4°405 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error ref. #.r.e.
50 Id. at 233.
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both investors end up with the same amount of stock."' This procedure
should only be used if there is full disclosure to, and agreement by, all the
shareholders. A possible danger with this stock issuance plan is that the
shareholder with the modest contribution shares equally in the control of
the corporation. There is also the possibility of this shareholder forcing an
early dissolution in which event he would share on an equal per share basis
with the shareholder that had made the larger per share contribution.
This result can, of course, be limited by either using two classes of stock,
limiting voting rights, or executing a voting agreement or voting trust.
The authors have some hesitancy in recommending this procedure in
Texas to the full extent suggested by Professor Herwitz as a result of the
Manhart decision which might lead a court to hold that the difference
amounted to compensation for future services.
Par Versus No-Par Stock. The articles of incorporation must either state
the par value of the authorized shares or state that they have no par."
In either case, the shares may not be issued for less than par or for less
than the full stated value attached to the no-par shares."' Thus, caution
should be twice exercised by the board of directors in the valuation-of-
consideration process. First, the value placed on the consideration (prop-
erty or service) received by the corporation for the issuance of its shares
should be commensurate with the nature and utility of such property or
service to the corporation. And second, the value of such property or serv-
ice to the corporation should be equal to or greater than the par value
of par stock or the assigned or stated value of no-par stock issued therefor;
otherwise, the issued stock would be "watered" and the subscriber could
be held liable" to the corporation or its creditors for the difference between
the stock's purchase price and its par or assigned value."
"Historically, the issuing price of shares of a company and the par value
of the shares were identical."'" The corporation's capital was simply the
aggregate amount received as consideration for the issuance of shares, and
stock issued for less than par value amounted, with rare exception, to wat-
ered stock, because there had not been adequate consideration. 7 The ensu-
ing frustrated corporate financial planning led to the development in mod-
ern incorporation statutes of low-par and no-par stock, which has caused
"See Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in the Organization of a Close
Corporation, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1098 (1962).
"'TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 3.02A(4), as amended, (Supp. 1968).
"id. art. 2.15A, B (1956). See also id. art. 2.16A.
'4 Id. art. 2.21A.
"In Fulton v. Abramson, 369 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), a fictitious partnership was
transferred to a corporation in return for some of its shares. Later additional stock was sold to
another shareholder at $1.00 per share. Upon bankruptcy the partnership transferors, when sued
by the trustee in bankruptcy of the corporation, argued that since full consideration had not been
paid for the stock they held, such stock was "illegal" under the TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
2.16 (1956), and thus they did not have to pay the difference between what was paid for the stock
and its value at issuance. The court held that the language of art. 2.16 was not designed to shield
the delinquent shareholders who were arguing that the stock issuance was illegal.
56Knauss, Capitalization and Financing, in PROCEEDINGS OP THE 1965 TWENTIETH ANNUAL
Mississippi LAW INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE PRACTICE 58 (1965).




the concept of "watering" to lose much of its practical significance. If the
corporation uses par value stock or low-par stock (for example, stock hav-
ing a low par value of $1 per share), the consideration received in excess
of the par value is considered capital surplus" and need not be allocated
to the stated capital account. Thus, if the par value of stock is $1 per share
and the corporation receives $12 per share upon issuance thereof, $1 per
share must be allocated to CAPITAL and $11 per share may be allocated
to CAPITAL SURPLUS. On the other hand, if the stock issued has no par
value at all, but only a stated or assigned value, no more than twenty-
five per cent of the total consideration received by the corporation for
that stock may be placed in the capital surplus account." Using the same
figures as above, if no-par stock is issued for $12 per share, a maximum of
only $3 per share may be allocated to CAPITAL SURPLUS; the remain-
der, or $9 per share, must be allocated to CAPITAL.
A plentiful amount of capital surplus is desirable because it offers a
great degree of financial flexibility. It is relatively unrestricted in character
and supplies the financial means for effectuating many corporate actions,
such as the purchase of the corporation's own shares in certain instances, "°
the payment of a stock dividend, " the making of a distribution in partial
liquidation,6 ' and the absorption of operating losses after elimination of
earned surplus.6 Thus, the use of no-par stock rarely would appear desir-
able. On the contrary, the use of low-par stock is the most advantageous
way of creating a greater amount of capital surplus since all consideration
received above par value may be placed in the capital surplus account. But
despite the inherent disadvantages in no-par stock, approximately twenty
per cent of all charters filed in Texas continue to use no-par stock."'
The Necessary $1,000 Capital. A corporation cannot commence business
until it has received at least $1,000 in consideration for the issuance of its
shares." Thus, it is mandatory that the articles of incorporation specifically
state that the corporation will not commence business until it has received
for the issuance of its shares at least $1,000 in money, labor done, or prop-
erty actually received." However, money from the $1,000 amount may be
paid out immediately for reasonable expenses of incorporation, without
rendering the shares not fully paid and non-assessable."' The reasonable ex-
penses of incorporation usually means attorney's fees, but can also include
other expenses the promoters incurred on behalf of the corporation prior
to its formation. As to the reasonableness of such amounts, a legal fee based
"1Tyx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.17A (1956). " 'Capital surplus' means the entire surplus
of a corporation other than its earned surplus and its reduction surplus." Id. art. 1.02A(15).
5 1rd. art. 2.17B.
6Od. art. 2.03D.
61Id. art, 2.38A(3).6
"Id. art. 2.40.61Id. art. 4.13B.
64 Statistics from the Texas Secretary of State's office show that out of a sample of 1,000 charters
filed in 1968, approximately 20%' used no-par stock; whereas, some 53% used $1 par value and
some 13%7 used $10 par value.
'TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 3.05A, as amended, (Supp. 1968).
66 d. art. 3.02A(7) (1956).7 Id. art. 2.18A, as amended, (Supp. 1968).
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on the minimum bar fee schedule for incorporation would certainly be rea-
sonable, but a charge amounting to all the consideration paid would prob-
ably be considered unreasonable. If an unreasonable amount were paid
out, the responsible party would be the board of directors, or whoever
authorized the expenditure, although the attorney advising such a decision
would probably find himself impleaded in the proceedings.
This $1,000 capital may include both stated capital and capital surplus
since the statute specifically phrases the requirement in terms of "consid-
eration," which means whatever is paid in. Some draftsmen feel that if
more than $1,000 is being invested in the corporation, this larger amount
should be declared as the necessary capital, and in this regard the Secretary
of State's office has received charters requiring as much as $50,000 or
$100,000 capital. This practice is not only unnecessary but also dangerous
because those who assent to this figure may possibly be liable for the entire
amount if it is not actually paid. "" Furthermore, a good draftsman should
anticipate that a prospective investor's withdrawal or the inability other-
wise to raise the large investment capital stipulated in the articles of incor-
poration will subject his client to the necessity of filing a subsequent
amendment in order to lower the required investment capital figure. Thus,
the prevailing and preferred practice in Texas is to provide for the mini-
mum $1,000 initial capital in the articles of incorporation." It is worth not-
ing that this capital requirement bears no relation to necessary working
capital which will probably be substantially more than $1,000. If the busi-
ness is launched without adequate working capital for its business needs
there is possible liability for the shareholders under a theory of piercing the
corporate veil.
Registered Office and Agent. The articles of incorporation must also set
forth the name of the initial registered agent and the address of the initial
registered office."0 The function of the registered agent is to receive official
communication from and through the Secretary of State's office and service
of process if the corporation is sued.' For this reason, the registered agent
must be a named individual. The agent cannot be a law firm nor can it be
a corporation unless the agent-corporation has been specifically authorized,
as one of its purposes in its articles of incorporation, to act as agent for
other corporations (i.e., one of the so-called corporation service companies).
Frequently an officer of the prospective corporation will be named in
the articles as the registered agent. A more desirable practice, however, is
to name the corporation's attorney as the registered agent since he is ac-
customed to receiving legal papers and is not likely to let them go un-
answered, which might be the case with a corporate officer. Furthermore,
designation of the attorney as the registered agent also maintains his ties
68See id. arts. 2.41A(5), 3.05A (1956).
69 Statistics from the Texas Secretary of State's office show that out of a sample of 1,000 charters
filed in 1968, some 963 (or 96.3%) provided for initial capital of $1,000, 9 provided for initial
capital of $2,000, 4 provided for initial capital of $3,000, 5 provided for initial capital of $5,000,
11 provided for initial capital of $10,000, and 2 provided for initial capital of $50,000.7 5 T~x. Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. art. 3.02A(10) (1956); see id. art. 2.09.71 See id. art. 2.11A.
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with the corporation at a minimal risk of personal liability which is not
the case if he serves as a director or incorporator.
To insure proper service of process, the articles must also state the ad-
dress of the registered office. The registered office need not be the corpora-
tion's principal place of business, but it must be a place where the reg-
istered agent can be found. If a corporate officer is to serve as registered
agent, the registered office address would normally be that of the corpora-
tion, and if a corporate service company is used, the registered office must
be the business address of that particular company. The office of the reg-
istered agent must include a building or a street address; a post office box
or simply the name of a city will not be sufficient. One exception is made
by the office of the Secretary of State: if the population of the registered
agent's town is less than 5,000, either the name of the town without a
street address is acceptable or a rural route number plus a box number is
acceptable and frequently used by attorneys in certain cities to escape the
city tax assessor.
Initial Directors. The articles of incorporation must state the number of
the initial directors and their names and addresses.72 Most Texas corpora-
tions are of the small, close variety and will normally have only the re-
quired minimum of three directors." The initial directors are responsible
for conducting the affairs of the corporation until the first annual meet-
ing of the shareholders, or until their successors are elected and meet any
qualifications prescribed by the articles or bylaws. This latter situation
usually occurs immediately upon formation of the corporation.
Incorporators. The names, addresses, and signatures of the three incorpora-
tors must be set forth in the articles of incorporation. ' Recitations to the
effect that all of the incorporators are natural persons (hence no other
corporations) who are each twenty-one years of age or more, and at least
two of whom are "citizens" of the State of Texas, must also be set forth."'
Although it is far from certain what is meant by "citizens of the State of
Texas," this phrase is the mandatory statutory language, and the only
specification that will be accepted by the office of the Secretary of State.
For example, it is not acceptable to state that two of the incorporators
are merely "residents of the State of Texas."
It is very common in Texas for attorneys to serve as initial directors or
incorporators, especially in the latter capacity as these are quite frequently
dummies. However, this practice is fraught with hazards, including pos-
sible liability for satisfaction of the initial capital and possible exposure
under recent federal decisions greatly extending the liabilities of officers
72 id. art. 3.02A(11).
7' Id. art. 2.32A. Statistics from the Texas Secretary of State's office show that out of a sample
of 1,000 charters filed in 1968, 805 (or 80.5%) made provision for 3 directors, 163 (or 16.3%)
made provision for 4 directors, 20 (or 2%) made provision for 5 directors, and 4 (or 0.4%) made
provision for 6 directors.
74 TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. arts. 3.02A(12), 3.01A (1956).
75 1d. art. 3.01A.
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and directors in the filing of registration statements and the use of inside
information."
B. Other Provisions Which May Be Included in the Charter
In addition to the mandatory provisions previously discussed, the articles
of incorporation may contain any provision which is not inconsistent with
Texas corporate law or any provision required or permitted by the TBCA
to be in the bylaws." Some of the provisions are purely optional; yet others
are "optional mandatory" provisions, that is, provisions which, if not cov-
ered in the articles of incorporation, will be controlled by a specific rule
of Texas law on that particular point.
Preemptive Rights. An example of the "optional mandatory" concept is
the inclusion of a provision in the articles of incorporation limiting or de-
nying shareholders preemptive rights in acquiring additional or treasury
shares of the corporation."8 Unless such rights are limited or denied in the
articles of incorporation the TBCA implication is that shareholders are
entitled to full preemptive rights to acquire unissued as well as treasury
shares of the corporation."9 Thus, it is best to specify whether preemptive
rights will be allowed and, if so, to what extent, in order to make clear
the intention of the incorporators and to provide for the contingency of
legislative amendments. If the corporation is to become publicly held, it
will likely be the desire of the prospective managers to deny preemptive
rights," whereas the opposite conclusion will often be reached if the cor-
poration is to be closely held.8 It is interesting to note that of all the char-
ters currently filed with the Secretary of State, very few make reference
to preemptive rights.8 The draftsman must be aware, however, that in
order to properly restrict stockholder preemptive rights, the limitation
or denial must be placed on the stock certificates themselves.
Powers. An important distinction which should be noted is that purposes
and powers are neither legally nor functionally the same. Since the two
terms are not synonymous, the corporate clauses which embody each
" See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"
7 TEX. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 3.02A(9) (1956).
7Id. art. 3.02A(8).75 1d. art. 2.22C, as amended, (Supp. 1968). This is a somewhat broader preemptive right than
is found in most states because treasury shares are seldom included.
801Denial would allow management much greater freedom of action with future issues of cor-
porate shares, thus virtually insuring a greater price for these issues. G. SEWARD, BASIC CORPORATE
PRACTICE 47 (1966).
81 The reason for this is that no shareholder in the small corporation wants to see his initial
attributes of ownership (voting rights, dividend rights, percentage of stock ownership) diluted.
Id. I8 Statistics from the Texas Secretary of State's office show that out of a sample of 1,000
charters filed in 1968, only 95 (or 9.5%) denied preemptive rights while only 43 (or 4.3%)
granted preemptive rights.
"
5 TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.22C, as amended, (Supp. 1968). For the mechanics of this
requirement, see Castle, Restrictions on Transferability of Securities, Vol. 7, No. 3 BULLETIN OF
THE SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING & BUSINESS LAW 7 (Tex. State Bar, Jan. 1969).
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should not be the same."4 The corporate powers enable the corporation to
carry out or implement its purposes, but the corporate purposes do not
prescribe its powers.
Article 2.02 of the TBCA contains a list of numerous general powers of
the corporation.'" Thus, it is not necessary to set forth in the articles of in-
corporation any of the corporate powers enumerated in the Act. " In addi-
tion, many powers, such as the ability to establish a corporate hierarchy
and to make rules for corporate internal management, exist as necessary
incidents to the corporate form of doing business, and no statement there-
of in the articles or bylaws is required." Thus, some writers advocate that
the powers clause should be short and general."8 Specificity should only be
utilized when it is desired to deny to the corporation, or to limit its exercise
of, certain powers which Texas corporations generally have or to make
absolutely certain that the corporation has particular stated powers (i.e.,
article 2.02 of the TBCA makes no mention of franchising, which might
prompt an overly cautious attorney to include franchising as a power)."
On the other hand, however, other writers suggest, when dealing with
potentially important corporations, the specific enumeration of the prin-
cipal powers which the corporation may perhaps need in the future."
Further reasons have been advanced on behalf of the detailed powers
clause: (1) clients generally want articles that "say something;" they
want more than a bare skeleton of a document; (2) no objection other
than redundancy can be made to the express statement of that which is
already granted; (3) the charter may receive principal attention from
parties in a foreign jurisdiction, such as financing institutions, who will
probably know little about the home state's general corporation act but
will be able to read what the corporate charter specifically authorizes; and
(4) the attorney, by focusing the client's attention on different alterna-
tives, can give the client an opportunity to reject, increase, or limit cer-
tain powers.8 ' "The draftsman may also assist the understanding of all con-
cerned by arranging statutory powers, which are often scattered through-
out a statute, in logical and coherent form."'"
In drafting the powers clause, whether short and general or detailed and
specific, a stipulation to the effect that the charter's express grant of cer-
tain powers shall not be construed as a limitation on other powers should
be included. It may also be desirable to provide that the powers may be
" K. PANTZER & R. DEER, THE DRAFTING OF CORPORATE CHARTERS AND BYLAWS 39-40
(1968):
A practice that is almost universal in corporate draftsmanship is the mingling of
purposes and powers. . . . These clauses are legally effective and will pass the scrutiny
of other lawyers. They will not contribute toward a client's or third party's under-
standing of the legal effect of the charter or advise the client of the various possi-
bilities of the Purpose and Powers Clause. . . . The [combined] use of these clauses
is not recommended.
"Id. See also TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.03 (1956).
86 Id. art. 3.02B.
"Id. art. 2.02A(19).
"N. LATrN, CORPORATIONS 188 (1959).
"9 C. ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 246 (1958).
90 G. SEWARD, BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE 48 (1966).




exercised anywhere in the world, but this does not eliminate the necessity
for qualifying to do business in other jurisdictions. In addition, the latter
stipulation may limit the exercise of the powers not forbidden by the laws
of the foreign jurisdiction.
Designation and Classification of Shares. When authorized by the articles
of incorporation, a corporation may issue more than one class of shares."
If there is to be more than one class of stock, any desired designations,
preferences, limitations, or relative rights concerning the particular classes
must be recited in the articles." Except for permissible variations in rela-
tive rights and preferences between series, all shares within the same class
must be identical. " The division of shares into classes does not appear to be
a very popular device in Texas, at least regarding new corporations." How-
ever, this practice does not dictate its nonuse.
Where there are several investors in a business, they may have entirely differ-
ent wishes as to the nature and productivity of their investment, and diff-
erent classes of stock can be useful in complying with their disparate goals.
For example, one group of investors may desire substantial security for their
capital investment and some assurance of a minimum return on their invest-
ment. Preferred stock is one means of accomplishing that. The other in-
vestors, who receive common stock, accept a greater risk, but if the business
is successful, they are the principal beneficiaries of its growth."'
Perhaps the most serious disadvantage in the use of different classes of
stock is foreclosure of the use of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue
Code which allows a corporation to be taxed as a partnership, an especially
valuable consideration for a new corporation that is likely to have losses in
its early years. Also, classification complicates the share structure, requiring
separate approval of each class of stock for many fundamental corporate
changes.
Dividends. The board of directors may from time to time declare dividends
on the corporation's outstanding shares, payable in cash, property, or its
own shares." Since dividends are not legally payable until declared by the
board of directors, the question becomes one of when and to what extent
the board may declare dividends and out of what corporate assets may
they be paid. Generally, Texas follows an "unrestricted earned surplus"
test for determining when and to what extent dividends may be declared
and paid; " that is, dividends may be declared and paid in cash or property
only out of the unrestricted earned surplus on the books of the corpora-
9 TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.12A (1956).
94 Id.
" Id. art. 2.13A. Permissible variations between different series of the same class are (a) the
dividend rate, (b) the price, terms, and conditions of redemption, (c) sinking fund provisions for
redemption, (d) the amount payable on shares in the event of either voluntary or involuntary
dissolution, and (e) terms and conditions affecting conversion rights. Id.
"' Statistics from the Texas Secretary of State's office show that out of a sample of 1,000 charters
filed in 1968, only 12 had divided the common stock into two classes, and 7 had authorized com-
mon and preferred stock.
97 D. KAHN, TAX AND BUSINESS PLANNING FOR CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 306 (1968).
See also Herwitz, supra note 51.




tion." In addition, dividends may be declared and paid in the corpora-
tion's own shares out of "unrestricted surplus" of the corporation.' Thus,
since "surplus" is defined as "the excess of the net assets of a corporation
over its stated capital,""' a stock dividend may be payable out of not only
earned surplus but also capital surplus. However, it is essential to remem-
ber that no dividend may be declared and paid in cash, property, or stock
when the corporation is insolvent or when the payment thereof would
render the corporation insolvent,. "insolvency" being defined in the
equity sense as the "inability of a corporation to pay its debts as they be-
come due in the usual course of its business. ' ' °N
Since a special or preferred class of stock may be authorized, having one
or more special rights or privileges, such stock may be given a preference
as to dividends and/or liquidation."' If preferred as to dividends, the stock
may be either fully cumulative, cumulative only to the extent earned, non-
cumulative, and/or participating or non-participating."' If cumulative,
then all preferred dividends of past years must be paid before the divi-
dend for the current year may be paid on such stock or on the common
stock. If cumulative only to the extent earned, the dividends on the pre-
ferred stock cumulate in each of the past years only to the extent that the
corporation had net earnings in each of those respective years. If non-
cumulative, any preferred dividend not paid in the year when due is lost
forever. In this regard, it should be noted that any dividends which have
"accrued" but which have not been "declared" by the board of directors
may be cancelled by an amendment to the articles of incorporation,1 7 but
such an amendment must be approved by an affirmative vote of at least
two-thirds of the outstanding shares entitled to vote thereon."' If the pre-
ferred stock is participating, the holder thereof is entitled to receive the
preferred dividend first and then to participate (fully or to a limited ex-
tent) with the common stock in any further dividends declared and paid
during the year. If non-participating, the preferred stockholder is entitled
only to the preferred dividend and no more. Thus while the draftsman
cannot make the test for paying dividends more liberal, he can further re-
strict the payment of dividends by appropriate provisions in the articles of
incorporation."
"'°Id. art. 1.02A(13), as amended, (Supp. 1968) provides:
'Earned surplus' means the portion of the surplus of a corporation equal to the balance
of its net profits, income, gains and losses from the date of incorporation, or from the
latest date when a deficit was eliminated by an application of its capital surplus or
stated capital or otherwise, after deducting subsequent distributions to shareholders
and transfers to stated capital and capital surplus to the extent such distributions
and transfers are made out of earned surplus. Earned surplus shall include also any
portion of surplus allocated to earned surplus in mergers, consolidations or acquisitions
of all or substantially all of the outstanding shares or of the property and assets of
another corporation, domestic or foreign.
'0TTEx. BUs. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.38A(2), (3) (1956).
"0'Id. art. 1.02A(12).
1a Id. art. 2.3 8A.
104Id. art. 1.02A(16).
101Id. art. 2.12B(1), (3).
"0'Id. art. 2.12B (2).
1 7 Id. art. 4.01B (1I).
0S Id. art. 4.02A(3).
109Id. art. 2.3 8A.
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Voting Rights. Normally each outstanding share, regardless of its class, is
entitled to one vote on each matter voted upon at the shareholders' meet-
ings unless such voting rights are limited or denied by the articles of in-
corporation.11 This is another "optional mandatory" provision, because if
the voting rights of any class of stock are to be restricted or denied, such
restriction or denial must be set forth in the articles; otherwise, each out-
standing share is entitled to voting rights. It is unclear under the TBCA
whether one share may have more or less than one full vote. The Secre-
tary of State has previously refused to approve a fractional vote per share
or more than one vote per share."' It should be noted that the right to
vote cannot be denied on certain matters such as mergers, consolidations,
or sales of significantly all of the corporate assets."'2
Cumulative Voting. Cumulative voting, "the privilege given a shareholder
in voting on directors to multiply the number of shares he owns by the
number of places to be voted on and then vote the total for one nominee
or distribute the same among as many nominees as he sees fit,""' has had
a varied and uncertain existence in Texas law. After the TBCA was en-
acted in 1955, article 2.29D was amended to provide that cumulative
voting did not exist unless expressly authorized by the articles of incorpo-
ration. This amendment expressly saved the original provision for corpora-
tions formed prior to the effective date of the amendment, August 21,
1957. Again, in 1964, article 2.29D was amended to permit cumulative
voting unless expressly prohibited by the articles of incorporation, but
nothing was said in this amendment regarding the status of cumulative
voting in corporations formed between August 21, 1957, and June 1,
1964, the effective date of the latter amendment."4 Under present Texas
law, therefore, the shareholder is entitled to cumulative voting unless such
is expressly prohibited in the articles of incorporation; however, the valid-
ity of this statement as applied to corporations formed between August 21,
1957, and June 1, 1964, is not clear. "It is the understanding of the [State
Bar] Committee that at present shareholders of a domestic corporation,
whenever incorporated, have the right of cumulative voting unless the
right is expressly denied in the articles of incorporation.""'s Thus, in order
to provide for the contingency of additional statutory amendments, it
is best for the draftsman to state in the articles of incorporation whether or
not cumulative voting is desired, even though the present law provides
that there is a right to cumulative voting unless prohibited by the articles.
1 1Id. art. 2.29A, as amended, (Supp. 1968). Treasury shares may not be voted directly or
indirectly by the corporation. Id. art. 2.29B (1956).
... Lecture by Ivon Lee, Legal Counsel, Office of the Secretary of State, presented at Southern
Methodist University School of Law, Mar. 2, 1968.
112 See TEX. Bus. CoRi. AcT ANN. arts. 5.03B, 5.10A(3) (1956).
... Lebowitz, Cumulative Voting Under Texas Law, Vol. 3, No. 6 BULLETIN OF THE SECTION
ON CORPORATION, BANKING & BusINEss LAW 1 (Tex. State Bar, Dec. 1964). This article presents
a concise and thorough discussion of cumulative voting in Texas. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.29D(1), as amended, (Supp. 1968).
I"' For a complete discussion of the historical development of article 2.29D of the Texas Business
Corporation Act, see Lebowitz, supra note 113, at 1-2.




Any corporate amendment to the articles of incorporation prohibiting the
right of cumulative voting is effective only after an affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the shares of each class entitled to vote on such amend-
ment."'
Shares in Series. A popular fund-raising technique for large corporations is
to issue shares in series. Each year for several succeeding years, a certain
number of preferred shares may be issued at a given dividend rate. How-
ever, only preferred shares may be issued in series, and the authorization
of these shares must be stated in the articles of incorporation." ' If any of
these shares are later redeemed, they will revert to the authorized-but-
unissued status unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise."'
Redemption of Shares. Redemption is one method by which the corpora-
tion may reacquire its own shares. Any type of stock, common or pre-
ferred, that has a preference in liquidation may be made redeemable, al-
though liquidation preferences are more often a feature of preferred
stock. Redemption is to be distinguished from repurchase in that the for-
mer type of reacquisition of shares is pursuant to an agreement. Such a
procedure is governed by four important rules: (1) only shares having a
liquidation preference and not just a dividend preference may be re-
deemed,"' (2) shares may be redeemed only if authorized by the articles of
incorporation, 12 (3) the shares must be redeemed by a resolution of the
board of directors,"' and (4) the redeemed shares shall be cancelled (by
the procedure set forth in TBCA article 4.10B), and upon cancellation
such shares shall revert to the status of authorized-but-unissued shares un-
less the articles of incorporation state that they shall not be reissued."'
When shares are not made redeemable, the only way a corporation can
acquire them is by purchase. The permissible reasons for reacquiring the
shares are (1) to eliminate fractional shares, (2) to collect or compromise
indebtedness owed by or to the corporation, (3) to pay dissenting share-
holders entitled to appraisal payment, and (4) to effect the purchase or
redemption of its redeemable shares."' In general, the shares may be pur-
chased to the extent that the corporation has sufficient unrestricted sur-
plus. Only a board of directors' resolution is needed to purchase shares with
earned surplus,"' but if capital surplus is to be used, the shareholders must
approve the transaction by a two-thirds vote.'" When purchased, the shares
become treasury shares,"0 but the purchase does not reduce the stated
capital of the corporation unless and until the shares are formally can-
".. TEX. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 2.29D(2), as amended, (Supp. 1968).
"'id. art. 2.13 (1956).
"8 Id. art. 4.1OA.
"a Id. art. 4.09.
".. Id. art. 4.08.
121 Id.
12 Id. art. 4.10A.
123 Id. art. 2.03B.
124 1d. art. 2.03C.
I" Id. art. 2.03D.
11 Id. art. 1.02(9).
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celled. " 7 This may be an important consideration in determining the cor-
porate franchise tax under the Texas Franchise Tax Statute,"8 since part of
that tax is based on the stated capital of the corporation. Thus, it may be
advantageous to reduce the stated capital (and thereby the tax) of the
corporation by reacquiring shares and filing a cancellation thereof (amend-
ment is not necessary under TBCA articles 4.10 and 4.11) with the Sec-
retary of State's office to cancel the shares.
Restrictions on the Transferability of Shares. Even though most securities
transactions are carried on under concepts of free transferability, there
may be instances, especially in the close corporation situation, in which re-
strictions upon the transferability of shares is desirable."2 ' Any corporation
may impose a restriction on the sale or other disposition of its shares pro-
vided the restriction (1) is set forth in the articles of incorporation or by-
laws of the corporation, (2) is copied at length or in summary form on the
face of each stock certificate affected (if in summary form, the restriction
must be copied at length on the back of the certificate and properly re-
ferred to on the face therof), and (3) does not unreasonably restrain or
prohibit transferability.' In lieu of setting forth the restriction at length
on the face or back of the certificate, such restriction may be incorporated
by reference on the face or back of the certificate if the applicable parts
of the articles of incorporation, bylaws, resolution, or agreement embody-
ing the full restriction is filed with the Secretary of State.'2 ' This latter
procedure has proven fairly popular in Texas as there are several hundred
such papers presently filed with the Secretary of State.' The popularity
of this device stems from the inability of most Texas lawyers (the authors
included) to satisfactorily summarize both restrictions on transferability of
stock and a buy-sell agreement in the approximately 150 words that one
can squeeze onto the back of a stock certificate.
Generally speaking, in order for the restriction to be valid, it must be
reasonable in nature. Furthermore, there must be a legitimate business pur-
pose for imposing the restriction, with adequate notice thereof to the share-
holder."' Reasonable restrictions include those defining (1) the preemptive
or prior rights of the corporation or its shareholders to purchase any shares
offered for transfer, (2) the rights and obligations of the holders of any
class of stock, composed of no more than twenty holders, under a buy and
sell agreement, and (3) the rights of the corporation or of any other per-
' See id. arts. 2.03E, 4.10A, 4.11.
"ITx. TAx-GEN. ANN. art. 12.01, as amended, (Supp. 1968).
29 See Castle, supra note 83, for a concise and thorough discussion on restricting the transfer-
ability of securities in Texas.
"°TEx. Bus. CoRp. AcT ANN. art. 2.22A, as amended, (Supp. 1968).
'lId. art. 2.19F (1956). The Secretary of State will not accept the entire by-laws for filing,
only the applicable parts; however, the Secretary will accept the entire buy-sell agreement for filing.
"2 Lecture by Ivon Lee, Legal Counsel, Office of the Secretary of State, presented at Southern
Methodist University School of Law, Mar. 2, 1968.
" Legitimate corporate business purposes which have been generally approved include the cor-
porate desire to prohibit a shareholder who is indebted to the issuer from transferring his shares
before satisfying his debt to the corporation, and the corporate desire to have persons who are sym-




son granted an option or right of first refusal to purchase the shares of
the corporation. " These foregoing restrictions are deemed reasonable by
statute and are thus upheld by the courts." Unreasonable restrictions
might include those which require the directors' consent before the shares
may be transferred but which do not establish any criteria for the granting
or withholding of such consent, and those giving the directors the option
to purchase the shares at a price to be fixed by them in their sole dis-
cretion."
Even though the restriction is reasonable, it must be adequately com-
municated to the shareholder to be binding on him. As indicated pre-
viously, article 2.22A of the TBCA requires that such restriction be set
forth in the articles of incorporation or the bylaws and copied at length or
in summary form on the face of each certificate affected, unless such re-
striction is incorporated by reference on the certificate and filed with the
Secretary of State in accordance with the provisions of article 2.19F
of the TBCA. Moreover, section 8.204 of the Texas Business and Com-
merce Code provides: "Unless noted conspicuously on the security a re-
striction on transfer imposed by the issuer even though otherwise lawful
is ineffective except against a person with actual knowledge of it."'' 7 Thus,
the effect of these provisions is to place upon the issuer the duty of prop-
erly noting the restriction on its certificates and of otherwise communicat-
ing such information to the prospective shareholders. If the restriction is
not properly noted on the certificate and if the purchaser has no actual
knowledge of the restriction, it is apparent that such purchaser acquires the
security free of any restrictions thereon.
Statistics from the office of the Secretary of State indicate that restric-
tions on the transferability of shares in Texas are rarely placed in the ar-
ticles of incorporation,as and are probably more often found in the by-
laws. From Sandor Petroleum Corp. v. Williams" it is apparent that a cor-
poration may not unilaterally place restrictions on transferability upon any
of its shares which are already outstanding in the hands of its shareholders
through an amendment to the bylaws, unless the shareholders agree, be-
cause to allow such would destroy a vested right which its shareholders had
acquired in the shares they hold.' ° The authors doubt whether the restric-
tions would be upheld even if in the form of an amendment to the articles
if there were some shareholders who disagreed with the amendment. Pre-
..
4
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.22B (1956).
lasSee Castecl v. Gunning, 402 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error ref. n.r.e.; Pomilla
v. Bumgardner, 326 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Coleman v. Kettering, 289 S.W.2d 953
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
136See, e.g., Howe v. Roberts, 209 Ala. 80, 95 So. 344 (1923).
sa7TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 8.204 (1968).
.. Statistics from the Texas Secretary of State's office show that out of a sample of 1,000
charters filed in 1968, only 31 (or 3.1%) contained restrictions on the transfer of shares.
... 321 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), error ref. n.r.e.
14o In Williams, the corporation sought to impose a restriction on the transferability of its
shares by amending its bylaws after a number of the shares had been issued. The court held that
even though such a restriction (giving the corporation a right of first refusal) was reasonable
within the meaning of TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.22B (1956), the restriction was not
effective as to those shares already outstanding because the shareholders had acquired a vested right
in their free transferability which could not be affected by the unilateral action of the corporation.
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sumably the court might hold that vested rights can only be changed by
express consent of all parties. Thus, it is advisable to establish restrictions
on the transferability of shares at the time of incorporation in accordance
with the procedure noted above.
Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation. Article 4.02 of the TBCA
suggests the procedure for amending the articles of incorporation, and gen-
erally the following steps may be followed:.41 (1) the board of directors
must adopt a resolution setting forth the proposed amendment and direct-
ing that it be submitted to a vote at either an annual or a special meeting
of the shareholders, (2) written or printed notice of the proposed amend-
ment must be given to each shareholder entitled to vote thereon not less
than ten nor more than fifty days before the date of the meeting," and
(3) the shareholders must approve the amendment by an affirmative vote
of two-thirds of the shares entitled to vote thereon. In 1967, article 4.02
was amended to allow the amending of the articles of incorporation "by
the unanimous written consent of the incorporators of a corporation which
has not commenced business and which has not issued any shares or accept-
ed any subscriptions."'" This change was designed to meet the needs of the
situation in which, after the articles of incorporation have been filed, the
incorporators find it necessary to amend them before any shares have been
issued.
Shareholder Quorum and Voting Requirements. Article 2.28 of the
TBCA provides that unless the articles of incorporation specify otherwise,
the holders of a majority of the shares entitled to vote constitute a quorum,
but in no event shall a quorum consist of the holders of less than one-
third of the shares entitled to vote. Thus, it is possible to provide in the
articles of incorporation for a quorum requirement of as much as 100 per
cent or as little as thirty-three and one-third per cent of the shares entitled
to vote. This, then, is an "optional mandatory" provision because if noth-
ing is said in the articles of incorporation about shareholder quorum re-
quirements, a majority of the shares entitled to vote constitutes a quorum.
A bylaw is ineffective to change the quorum requirements under this arti-
cle.
Article 2.28 also provides that a vote of a majority of the shares entitled
to vote and represented at a meeting at which a quorum is present is suffi-
cient to take shareholder action, unless the vote of a greater number is re-
quired by law, the articles of incorporation, or the bylaws. Thus, where a
majority vote is required under the statute to take specific shareholder ac-
tion, the articles of incorporation or the bylaws may effectively require a
greater-than-majority vote for such action. On the other hand, however,
where either the statute or the articles of incorporation require a greater-
than-majority vote for specific shareholder action, a bylaw requiring a
141 See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 4.02A, as amended, (Supp. 1968).
141 See id. art. 2.25A (1956).
141 d. art. 4.02C (Supp. 1968).
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greater number is ineffective because it would be in conflict with the sta-
tute or the articles of incorporation. 4
Of broader application is article 9.08 of the TBCA which provides that
if the articles of incorporation call for a greater voting requirement than
is required by the statute with respect to specific shareholder action, "the
articles of incorporation shall control." Thus, for any given type of share-
holder action, the articles of incorporation may validly require a greater
vote (up to 100 per cent of the shares entitled to vote thereon) than is re-
quired by the statute; however, the articles may never provide for a small-
er vote than is required by statute because to do so would render the arti-
cles in conflict with the statute. The TBCA may be viewed as setting the
minimum floor on the voting requirement for given shareholder action,
and by virtue of article 9.08, the articles of incorporation may increase
this shareholder voting requirement above the statutory norm. But the arti-
cles may never reduce the voting requirement below the minimum statu-
torily required floor.
These greater-than-majority (high) shareholder quorum and voting re-
quirements may prove beneficial, especially in the close corporation in
which the majority owners wish to make their position more secure by
making it more difficult for the minority to impinge upon their control.
However, high quorum or voting requirements offer one inherent disad-
vantage: the higher the quorum and/or voting requirements, the greater
the chance that no corporate action will be taken because the necessary
quorum or vote is not forthcoming.
Executive Committee. If the articles of incorporation or the bylaws so
provide, a majority of the total number of the board of directors may de-
signate two or more directors to constitute an executive committee which
may exercise all of the authority of the board in the business affairs of the
corporation except where the action of the board is specified by the TBCA
or other applicable law." However, this delegation of authority to the
executive committee will not relieve the board of directors or any member
thereof of any responsibility imposed upon the board or the individual
member by law. Even though article 2.31 of the TBCA provides that
the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of
directors, the Supreme Court of Texas has held that the board of directors
may delegate to the executive committee (or to subordinate officers or
agents) the power to perform any act within the business affairs of the
corporation which the board itself could legally perform, even though the
performance of such an act involved the exercise of the highest judgment
and discretion." Any member of the executive committee, or any officer
or agent of the corporation, elected or appointed by the board of directors,
may be removed by the board of directors when in the board's judgment
the best interests of the corporation would be served thereby.1"'
144 See Comment of Bar Committee, 3A TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. 414 (1956).
I's TEX. Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. art. 2.36A (1956).
146 San Antonio Joint Stock Land Bank v. Taylor, 129 Tex. 335, 105 S.W.Zd 650 (1937).
14
'Trx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.43A (1956).
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Interested Oficer and Director Transactions. Since the director stands in a
fiduciary relationship to his corporation, transactions with the corporation
in which the director has a personal interest often raise questions of pro-
priety. Even though a director or officer of a corporation is not disqualified
from dealing with his corporation,'" it may often be desirable to include in
the articles of incorporation a provision giving the director or officer per-
mission to engage in transactions with his corporation in which he has a
personal interest, provided he makes full disclosure of his interest therein.
Such a provision should be used to clarify the relationship of the interested
director with his corporation so that confusion will be avoided in the long
run. Although the provision offers advantages, it does not appear to be in
popular use in Texas."" Even in the absence of such a provision in the ar-
ticles, contracts between the corporation and its directors or officers are not
void but are merely voidable if unfair or fraudulent, with the burden rest-
ing upon the fiduciary (director or officer) to prove fairness." °
C. Executing and Filing the Articles of Incorporation
The articles of incorporation must be verified by the incorporators."'
The attorney should be sure that the notary's statement includes the words
"duly sworn," because if the incorporators merely "acknowledge" rather
than "verify" (or swear) that the statements contained therein are true,
the articles will be rejected.
One should remember that duplicate originals of the articles of incor-
poration,1 1 accompanied by a fee of $100, 3a must be filed with the Secre-
tary of State. If the Secretary of State is satisfied that the articles conform
to law, he will issue a certificate of incorporation and will deliver this certi-
ficate and one of the duplicate originals of the articles to the incorporators
or their representatives."' Upon the issuance of this certificate of incorpora-
tion, the corporate existence begins, and the certificate is conclusive evi-
dence that the incorporators have performed all conditions precedent to
incorporation under the TBCA."'
After the certificate of incorporation is issued, the corporation "[may]
not transact any business or incur any indebtedness, except . . .as . ..
incidental to its organization or to obtaining subscriptions to or payment
for its shares, until it has received for the issuance of shares consideration
of the value of at least One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), consisting of
'
48 Popperman v. Rest Haven Cemetery, Inc., 162 Tex. 255, 345 S.W.2d 715 (1961).
149Statistics from the Texas Secretary of State's office show that out of a sample of 1,000
charters filed in 1968, only 69 (or 6.9%) contained an interested director clause.
'a0International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963).
salTFx. Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. art. 3.01A (1956).
15
2 Id. art. 3.03A.
"lid. art. 10.01A(1) (Supp. 1969) (effective Sept. 1, 1969). A certified copy of the charter,
or any other document filed for record with the Secretary of State by anyone, may be had for the
payment of $1.00 per page, plus $1.00 for certification. The customary need for a certified copy
of one's own charter would occur when the corporation intends to immediately qualify to do
business in another state.154 See id. art. 3.03 (1956), for details of this procedure. One additional requirement that the
attorney should make sure is attended to is applying for an employer's identification number, as
this will be the number used for payment of the annual franchise tax.
'"' Id. art. 3.04A.
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money, labor done, or property actually received." ' This $1,000 minimum
is the only test of whether a corporation has received sufficient considera-
tion for its shares before beginning business. 57 Thus, a corporation may
obtain its charter from the Secretary of State before receiving $1,000, but
it may not begin business operations before $1,000 in money, labor done,
or property is actually received by the corporation. If business is begun
before this is received then the shareholders and officers are in effect en-
gaged in a partnership and will be personally liable.
III. DRAFTING THE BYLAWS
Since the bylaws of a corporation differ from the charter in many re-
spects,' the question in drafting the bylaws becomes one of what provi-
sions to place therein. This question takes on importance when the drafts-
man remembers that normally the bylaws are easier to change than the
charter. Thus, placing something in the charter may mean that it is more
or less permanently solidified in the corporate structure, in addition to
being open to official scrutiny and public inspection; whereas, if the pro-
vision were placed in the corporate bylaws, this would not necessarily be
the case.
Paralleling the considerations involved in drafting the corporate pur-
pose clause are the two approaches in drafting the bylaws. The first ap-
proach is that the less said in the bylaws, the better, since nothing there
can increase the powers of the corporation but rather may serve to limit.
If the draftsman adheres to this approach, the bylaws need only include
those provisions required by the applicable statute. The other approach pro-
vides that it is a help to management and a safeguard to legal procedure
if the bylaws set out what amounts to an operating manual of basic rules
for ordinary transactions, whether derived from statute or from the
charter. As one expert notes, the bylaws constitute a "working document"
and thus should be made "sufficiently complete to be relied upon by the
officers of the corporation as almost a check list in administering the affairs
of the corporation even though this results in bylaws which paraphrase
statutory requirements. The theory of this check list approach is that
clients will read the bylaws but not the statutes. 1 5
Since the function of the bylaws is to provide a pattern for the in-
ternal operation of the corporation, the draftsman should attempt to pro-
vide corporate officers and directors with a workable and accurate guide
so as to facilitate their handling of corporate affairs. A compromise be-
tween the two preceding approaches has been suggested. The compromise
arrangement provides for an inclusion of applicable statutes and charter
provisions in a supplement or addendum to the bylaws themselves. This
supplement could easily reflect any legislative changes or charter amend-
ments.'"
1"6 Id. art. 3.05A (Supp. 1968).
'See Comment of Bar Committee, 3A TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 50, 51 (Supp. 1968).
"'See Section I of this Article supra.
159 G. SEWARD, BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE 47 (1966).
I'H. HENN, CORPORATIONS 182 (1961).
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No matter which approach is chosen by the draftsman, the bylaws in
the end really supplement the charter, "filling in its skeleton structure with
details not important enough to be publicly filed..'.' They may contain a
wide variety of provisions subject only to the requirement that they be
consistent with the charter and the mandatory provisions of other relevant
laws. The TBCA provides that the initial bylaws of the corporation must
be adopted by the board of directors at an organizational meeting held
after the issuance of the charter," and that any provision required or
permitted by the Act to be set forth in the bylaws may be set forth in
the charter.'63 Thus, under Texas law the bylaws should be drafted to
meet the flexible needs of the corporate client in question. In this regard,
the following discussion is designed to cover some of the more important
provisions which should be included in the bylaws.
Shareholders. A number of items relevant to the shareholders should per-
haps be covered in the bylaws. For example, subsequent power to change
the bylaws is statutorily vested in the shareholders, but such power may be
delegated by the shareholders to the board of directors.' Thus, it is desir-
able to spell out in the bylaws whether the shareholders or the board of
directors have the initial power to alter or amend the bylaws, 6 ' which the
shareholders will ratify at the first meeting. In addition, a full description
of the shareholder meeting procedure should be set forth in the bylaws,
including the time and place of the annual shareholder meeting'6 and the
time, place, and procedure for calling a special shareholder meeting. 7 If it
is desired that shareholder meetings, either annual or special, be held at
any place other than the registered office of the corporation, the bylaws
must designate a reasonable place within or without the State of Texas.
Special meetings of the shareholders may be called by the president, the
board of directors, the holders of at least one-tenth of the shares entitled
to vote at the meetings, or such other officers or persons as provided in
the articles of incorporation or the bylaws.'
Written notice of the shareholder meeting must be given to each share-
holder entitled to vote at such meeting not less than ten nor more than
fifty days before the date of such meeting."' Thus, the procedure and the
nature of the notice to be given regarding the shareholder meeting should
be covered in the bylaws. This requirement of notice of the shareholder
meeting is for the benefit of the shareholders, and they may waive this
notice in writing before or after the meeting or by attending and partici-
161I G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE 348 (1959).
162 TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.23 (1956); see id. art. 3.06.
'"Id. art. 3.02A(9), as amended, (Supp. 1968).
1641d. art. 2.23 (1956).
"'Statistics from the Texas Secretary of State's office show that out of a sample of 1,000
charters filed in 1968, only 113 (or 11.3%) contained a provision giving the directors the power
to amend the bylaws.
166 TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.24A, B (1956). See generally Kerr & Wolf, Shareholders'
Meetings Under the Texas Business Corporation Act, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 713 (1965).
'Tmx Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.24C (1956). 
166 Id.
"' Id. art. 2.25.
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pating in the improperly called meeting without protest.7 ' A voting list of
the shareholders entitled to vote at the meeting should be prepared by the
person in charge of the stock transfer books at least ten days before each
meeting of the shareholders. "' Such a list is open to inspection by the
shareholders at all times during the meeting. Thus, the bylaws should make
provision for the preparation of the voting lists of the shareholders.
Other provisions relative to the shareholders which may be covered by
the bylaws include the provision of greater-than-majority quorum..' and
voting.. requirements for shareholder meetings. Of course, provision for a
greater-than-majority shareholder quorum requirement must be made in
the articles of incorporation, but it is not improper to repeat such a provi-
sion in the bylaws. Provision for a greater-than-majority shareholder vot-
ing requirement, at a meeting at which a quorum is present, may be made
in either the articles of incorporation or the bylaws. " Moreover, the by-
laws should prescribe the procedure to be followed in closing the transfer
books and establishing the record date to determine the shareholders en-
titled to notice of and to vote at any shareholder meeting, and the share-
holders entitled to a dividend. The transfer books may be closed not more
than fifty days nor less than ten days immediately preceding either the
meeting, or the date upon which the action calling for a closing of the
transfer books is taken. If the transfer books are not closed and no record
date is fixed, the date on which the notice of the meeting is mailed or the
date on which the resolution of the board of directors declaring a dividend
is adopted becomes in effect the record date for the determination of ap-
propriate shareholders.'
Perhaps the bylaws should also contain a provision regarding the voting
of shareholders by proxy. Normally, a shareholder may vote either in person
or by a proxy executed by him or his duly authorized agent. However, no
proxy is valid for more than eleven months from the date of its execu-
tion unless otherwise provided in the proxy, and such proxy is revocable
unless expressly provided therein to be irrevocable and unless otherwise
made irrevocable by law.7 . "The 1961 addition of the words 'and unless
otherwise made irrevocable by law' to Art. 2.29C makes it clear that, to
be irrevocable, a proxy must not only so state but must also satisfy the
requisites of irrevocability under the common law, such as by being
coupled with an interest or by being given as security."' 7 Moreover, the
registration of securities and proxy solicitations for corporations engaged
in interstate commerce, businesses affecting interstate commerce, corporate
securities traded by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
or corporations having at least 500 shareholders of record and over $1
170 Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515, 348 S.W.2d 517 (1961); see TEX. Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN.
art. 9.09 (1956).
'
7 1 TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.27A (1956).
17 Id. art. 2.28.
175 Id. art. 2.29, as amended, (Supp. 1968).
'
74 Id. art. 2.28 (1956). See also id. art. 2.29, as amended, (Supp. 1968); text accompanying
note 144 supra.1?aTx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.26 (1956).
176 Id. art. 2.29C, as amended, (Supp. 1968).
177 Comment of Bar Committee, 3A TEX. REv. Cry. STAT. ANN. 35 (Supp. 1968).
[Vol. 23
INCORPORATION PLANNING
million in total assets must comply with section 12 (g) (1) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and regulation 14A thereunder.
Finally, the bylaws may cover the shareholders' right to inspect and
examine the books and records of the corporation. Any person who has
been a shareholder for at least six months immediately preceding his de-
mand, or who is the holder of at least five per cent of all the outstanding
shares of the corporation, upon written demand stating a reasonable and
proper purpose therefor, has the right to examine the books of the cor-
poration at any reasonable time and to make extracts therefrom. 7 ' Even
though a shareholder's right to inspect the books is not absolute in nature,
in that a proper purpose therefor must be shown," this section is designed
to make it clear that the shareholder's common law right to examine the
corporate records is not restricted;8 . enforcement of this right may be
by mandamus.'81
Directors. The bylaws should also contain various provisions regarding the
directors of the corporation. A Texas corporation must have at least three
directors. Subject to this requirement, the number of directors should be
established by the bylaws (except that the number of the initial board of
directors is set by the articles of incorporation)."' If the bylaws do not
state the number of directors, the number shall be the same as that stated
in the articles of incorporation. The best procedure is to declare the num-
ber of directors through a bylaw provision, which usually may be amended
by the majority vote of the directors or the shareholders, because if abso-
lutely fixed by the articles of incorporation, the number of directors may
be changed only by an amendment to the articles which requires an
affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of the shares entitled to vote
thereon. If covered in the bylaws, the number of directors may be in-
creased or decreased by amendment to the bylaws, but no decrease may
abbreviate the term of any incumbent director. Regarding amendment
procedure, it has been held that the action of the shareholders in electing
four directors for four successive years resulted in an "amendment" of the
original bylaw provision for three directors so as to then provide for four
directors. 8' However, if the number of directors was controlled only by
the articles of incorporation, such a de facto amendment to the articles
would not be effective unless approved by an affirmative vote of the hold-
ers of two-thirds of the shares entitled to vote thereon and unless the pro-
cedure of TBCA article 4.02 were followed.
The qualifications of the members of the board of directors should be
1
'
8 TEx. Bus. Coitp. ACT ANN. art. 2.44B (1956).
'79 Guaranty Old Line Life Co. v. McCallum, 97 S.W.2d 966 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Dreyfuss
& Son v. Benson, 239 S.W. 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922), error ref.
... Texas Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Erwin, 397 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref.
n.r.e.
181 Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co. v. Loughridge, 425 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1968).
82 TEx. Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. art. 2.32 (1956). See also id. art. 3.02A(11), as amended,
(Supp. 1968). Statistics from the Texas Secretary of State's office show that out of a sample of
1,000 charters filed in 1968, approximately 805 (or 80.5%) provided for a 3-man board of direc-
tors, 16% used a 4-man board, 2% used a 5-man hoard, and 0.4% used a 6-man board.
'Keating v. K-C-K Corp., 383 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
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prescribed by the bylaws. The directors need not be residents of Texas un-
less the articles or the bylaws so require, and the articles or the bylaws may
prescribe other qualifications for the directors."' The term of each mem-
ber of the board of directors should be made clear by the bylaws. The
shareholders elect the directors, and each director holds office until his death
or until his successor is elected at a shareholder meeting, unless (a) the
directors are classified as permitted by TBCA article 2.33, or (b) the spe-
cific director is removed, prior to the expiration of his term, in accordance
with the provisions of the bylaws. Article 2.33 of the TBCA provides that,
if the board of directors consists of nine or more members, such directors
may be divided into two or three classes as nearly equal in number as
possible at the first annual meeting of the shareholders (or at any meeting
subsequent to the first annual meeting, but not prior thereto), and the
members of only one class of such directors may be elected at each suc-
ceeding annual meeting. In effect, the directors may be divided into classes
and given staggered terms of office, thus promoting some continuity of
experience.
Provision for the removal of a director and the procedure to be followed
in taking such action should be covered in the bylaws. The language of
TBCA article 2.32-"Unless removed in accordance with the provisions of
the bylaws"-indicates that a director may be removed for cause, pro-
vided that the reason and the procedure prescribed by the bylaws for such
removal are followed. It is also possible to provide in the bylaws for the
removal of a director without cause. Thus, directors may be removed at
any time, for cause or without cause, provided that such removal is au-
thorized by the bylaws.''
The procedure for filling a vacancy in the board of directors should be
prescribed in the bylaws. Article 2.34 of the TBCA provides that any va-
cancy in the board may be filled by an affirmative vote of a majority of
the remaining directors even though this number is less than a quorum of
the whole board. Thus, it is possible to provide in the bylaws that a
greater-than-majority vote of the remaining board is necessary to fill a
vacancy in the board. The statute provides that if the vacancy is filled,
it shall be filled only for the unexpired term of the predecessor in the
directorship.' In addition, another qualification is placed upon the filling
of a vacancy in the board: any vacancy created by an increase in the
number of directors must be filled by the shareholders, not the directors.
Director Meetings. Normally the directors act through a formal meeting
of the board; therefore, it is desirable to spell out in the bylaws the de-
tails of the regular director meeting, such as the time, place, and provision
for notice. Regular board meetings may be held with or without notice as
prescribed in the bylaws; however, special board meetings must be held
184 TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.31 (1956).
.. Comment of Bar Committee, 3A TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. 128 (1956). If the director
was elected through cumulative voting it may be held unfair to remove this director without cause.
There is no law on this point in Texas.
188 TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 2.34 (1956).
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upon such notice as provided in the bylaws.187 The required notice of a
board meeting may be waived either by the attendance of the director at
the meeting, unless he attends for the special purpose of objecting to the
transaction of any business because the meeting was improperly con-
vened,18" or by written waiver of such notice executed by a director either
before or after the meeting."" In 1967 article 9.10 of the TBCA was
amended to authorize the propriety of informal action taken by the board
of directors (or an executive committee) in the absence of a formal meet-
ing, provided that unanimous written consent thereto was given by the
board (or the committee)."' This was the first time informal board action
had been sanctioned by statute in Texas. However, such authority of the
board to act informally may be restricted by the articles of incorporation
or the bylaws.
The quorum and voting requirements of the board of directors should
be covered in the bylaws, but it is not improper to cover the subject in
the articles of incorporation. "A majority of the number of directors
fixed by the bylaws, or, in the absence of a bylaw fixing the number of
directors, a majority of the number stated in the articles of incorporation
[constitutes] a quorum for the transaction of business unless a greater
number is required by the articles of incorporation or the bylaws.' '9 1
Therefore, if nothing is said in either the articles or the bylaws regarding
director quorum and voting requirements, a majority of the whole board
constitutes a quorum and a majority of those present at a meeting having a
quorum is sufficient to transact the business of the board. However,
greater-than-majority director quorum and/or voting requirements may
be prescribed by the articles or the bylaws, and it is conceivable that
either or both requirements may be as high as one hundred per cent.
Officers. Since ordinarily the corporation can act only through its offi-
cers and agents,"9 the various officers of the corporation along with the re-
spective term, authority, duties, and qualifications of each office should be
spelled out in the bylaws. The officers must include at least a president, a
vice president, a secretary, and a treasurer, as elected from time to time
by the board of directors in the manner prescribed in the bylaws."3 Gen-
erally, any two or more offices of the corporation may be held by the
same person, except that the president and secretary shall not be the same
person, presumably because one of these officers may be called upon to
verify the power or position of the other. Furthermore, provision should
be made in the bylaws for the procedures to be followed upon the vacancy
of an office by the removal, resignation or death of an officer. It should be
noted that when the bylaws of the corporation specify a term for a given
1
8 7 id. art. 2.37B.
188 Id.
189 Id. art. 9.09.
19Id. art. 9.1OB, as amended, (Supp. 1968).
1911d. art. 2.35 (1956).
... Radio KBUY, Inc. v. Lieurance, 390 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
113TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.42A (1956).
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corporate office, a person may not be employed to fill that office for a
longer period of time than that specified in the bylaws.9
Interested Oficers and Director Transactions. Provision may also be made
in the bylaws granting permission to the officers and directors to engage in
transactions with the corporation in which one or more of the directors
has a personal interest. Even though such permission may have been given
in the articles of incorporation, it is not improper to repeat it in the by-
laws, and if such a provision is not covered in the articles, it should be
covered in the bylaws. 9' A provision of this sort, whether contained in the
articles or bylaws, is of dubious legal effect since the intended transaction
is still voidable for unfairness or fraud, with the burden resting upon the
officer or director to prove otherwise.'"
Compensation and Indemnification of Officers and Directors. Provision
should be made in the bylaws for the manner and amount of compensation
to be given each officer and director of the corporation. Moreover, it is
good practice to provide in the bylaws for the indemnification by the
corporation of the officers, directors, and other corporate personnel for
reasonable litigation expenses incurred by them in defending litigation
arising out of their execution of their official corporate capacity. There are
limits on such reimbursements; they could not, for example, be reimbursed
if they were eventually adjudged to have done wrong, and a provision
granting such would not be upheld. In regard to bylaw provisions de-
signed to benefit the officers or directors, the TBCA specifically prohibits
the loan of money by the corporation to its officers and directors, even
though such a loan is permissible if made to an employee of the corpora-
tion,"' and the directors who voted for or assented to the ultra vires loan
of money . . by the corporation to an officer or director are jointly and sev-
erally liable to the corporation for the amount of the loan until it is
repaid.'99
Other Provisions. Since the bylaws of a corporation constitute a manual
for the management of the internal affairs of the corporation, a number
of additional provisions may be included therein. Provisions may be made
in the bylaws for accounting matters such as the fiscal year and the books
and records of the corporation,'" and the handling of a deadlock or the
dissolution of the corporation."'
Items Which Should Not Be Specifically Included in the Charter or the
Bylaws. Very often it is advisable not to include certain items in either
" Pioneer Specialties, Inc. v. Nelson, 161 Tex. 244, 339 S.W.2d 199 (1960).
'
9
'TEX. Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. art. 2.42B (1956).
,
9 Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 568 (Tex. 1963).
9
"See TEx. Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. art. 2.02A(6) (1956).
... Republic Nat'l Bank v. Whitten, 383 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), aff'd, 397 S.W.2d
415 (Tex. 1965).
19 TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41A(4) (1956).
2oSee id. art. 2.44A.
21 See id. arts. 6.02, 6.03, as amended, (Supp. 1968).
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the charter or the bylaws. For example, specific details regarding the capi-
tal structure or the forms of the stock certificates of the corporation in-
cluded in either of the two basic corporate documents would unduly re-
tard the making of changes in such items as circumstances demand because
such a change would have to be effected by an amendment to the charter
or the bylaws. The normal practice is to place the matters in the minutes
of the directors' meetings. It is true that inclusion of such items in the
bylaws would eliminate any question regarding whether or not such had
been approved by the appropriate corporate authority; however, if com-
plete and appropriate corporate minutes are kept, the same result is
achieved.
IV. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTROL DEVICES
FOR THE CLOSE CORPORATION
The small or close corporation presents a special problem in regard to
the drafting of corporate charters and bylaws. This is fundamentally due
to a failure on the part of legislators and courts to recognize that the
nature and methods of operation, and thus the rules of operation, for the
close corporation are often very different from those of the publicly held
corporation. In this country, "with but few exceptions, corporation sta-
tutes have been drafted with publicly held corporations in mind and little
effort has been made to meet the needs of close corporations." ' Whether
separate, comprehensive statutes expressly directed toward the peculiar
problems of the close corporation should in fact be promulgated-a sig-
nificant area of discussion in itself- 2 °3is not within the scope of this Ar-
ticle.
The important point is that the draftsman must remember that the
close corporation differs materially in its characteristics and needs from the
large, public-issue corporation; thus the attorney should carefully scru-
tinize the statutes when drafting articles and bylaws because all of them
are generally geared to the "big" corporation. As one observer aptly warns,
"tclose corporations frequently present problems requiring unique solu-
tions-solutions not to be found in the orthodox phraseology of corporate
forms.""2 The same observer enumerates certain major areas of possible vari-
ance between the needs and the desires of the close corporation and the
public corporation: (1) general authority of directors, (2) preemptive
rights, (3) transfer of shares, (4) quorum and voting requirements for
02
F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 27 (1958).
20 See Adickes, A "Closed Corporation Law" for California, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1990 (1966);
Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-The Need for More and Improved Legislation,
54 GEO. L.J. 1145 (1966); Oppenheim, The Close Corporation in California--Necessity of Separate
Treatment, 12 HAST. L.J. 227 (1961); Prunty, Business Association, 1959 Survey of New York
Law, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rmp. 1425 (1959); Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Sta-
tutes, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 305 (1937); Winer, Proposing a New York Close Corporation Law, 28
CORNELL L.Q. 313 (1943); Wolens, A Round Peg-A Square Hole: The Close Corporation and
the Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 811 (1968). See also Note, Statutory Assistance for Closely Held Corporations,
71 HARV. L. REV. 1498 (1958); Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Cor-
poration, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 700 (1958).




shareholders' and directors' meetings, (5) removal of directors, (6) amend-
ment authority, (7) conflict of interest matters, (8) power to dispose of
corporate property, and (9) means by which corporate deadlocks can be
resolved.2"
The draftsman should readily perceive that the wording of the articles
or the bylaws in regard to any of the above items will be prompted by
different policy considerations, depending on whether a close or public cor-
poration is involved. For example, restrictions on the transferability of
shares and preemptive rights are almost always desirable in the close cor-
poration; however, the converse is usually true in the large, public cor-
poration. Another example revolves around the problem of the oppression
of minority shareholders (i.e., the "squeeze play") so common in close
corporations. The draftsman can attempt to prevent such a situation by
appropriate charter or bylaw provisions stipulating greater-than-majority
voting requirements regarding shareholder and/or director action. How-
ever, such a high voting requirement may in turn easily lead to deadlock
in the small corporation, a consideration militating against its use. This
difficulty can in turn be planned for by the insertion of an arbiter or
deadlock-breaking director provision, or by separate shareholder agree-
ment providing for the appointment of an arbiter.
Finally, consideration should be given to whether a particular provision
or clause should be inserted in the charter or bylaws or, perhaps, in a third
document. For example, the draftsman must decide whether to place re-
strictions on the transfer of shares (almost always desirable in the close
corporation) in the charter, bylaws, separate shareholders' agreement or in
all of these documents."' Pantzer and Deer..7 express two preferences which
are worthy of attention. First, if one wants to bind third parties (exclu-
sive of shareholders, officers, or directors), the charter is the proper in-
strument to use since the "bylaws are not filed or recorded and do not
operate as notice to third parties." ' Second, if it is desirable to deny share-
holders certain customary rights or privileges (such as voting rights), the
denial should be unequivocally stated in the articles. The reason is that
"[i]nclusion of any controversial position in bylaws, even though adopted
by shareholders, is not likely to be as efficacious. Most lawyers and judges
expect important provisions to be in the charter." ''
Since the close corporation is usually comprised of very few shareholders,
most or all of whom take an active part in the management of the busi-
ness, the maintenance of the established division of control within the busi-
ness, especially against the invasion of outsiders, is of significant impor-
tance. In this respect, there are a number of specific control devices avail-
able to the close corporation.
205 id.
206 See notes 130, 131 supra, and accompanying text. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
8-204.








Voting Trust. The voting trust, whereby the shareholders transfer their
stock to a trustee and confer upon him the right to vote or otherwise
represent their shares, is one device which may be used for control pur-
poses. To be valid in Texas, the voting trust must be in writing and must
not exceed ten years duration.210 In addition, a counterpart of the agree-
ment must be deposited with the corporation at its registered office and the
shares subject thereto must be transferred to the trustee or trustees for
the purpose of the agreement. " Even if the voting trust meets the fore-
going statutory requirements, it is equally important that the agreement
be executed for a proper purpose. Thus, a voting trust established for the
primary purpose of assuring the continued election of a certain person to a
lucrative corporate office, and establishing his successor in that position,
was held invalid as against public policy because it constituted an improper
interference with the internal managerial affairs of the corporation. ' On
the other hand, a voting trust is not invalid simply because the person for
whose benefit the trust was established is a settlor of the trust, is named as
a voting trustee, and is the one who had the agreement drawn and who
secured the signatures of most of the other parties thereto."3
Voting Agreement. Even though the voting agreement among sharehold-
ers was not favored under early Texas law, ' use of the device as a means
of control is now clearly permitted under the TBCAY1 The voting agree-
ment is a pact among shareholders that they will vote their shares as a
unit, in the manner prescribed in the agreement, on corporate matters
which are proper subjects for shareholder action. To be valid in Texas, such
a voting agreement must be in writing and must not exceed ten years in
duration." ' In addition, a counterpart of the agreement must be deposited
with the corporation at its registered office and the shares subject thereto
must bear a legend stating that such shares are subject to the provisions
of a voting agreement, a counterpart of which has been deposited with the
corporation at its principal office. 7 In order to be specifically enforceable,
such a voting agreement must meet the foregoing statutory requirements
and must be executed for a proper purpose. Thus, such a shareholder agree-
ment is permissible if entered into without fraud and if designed to ac-
complish only what the shareholders might have accomplished without the
agreement.1 8
Conversations with other lawyers and the authors' experience indicate
that voting agreements are favored over voting trusts. They are less for-
210 TEX. Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. art. 2.30A (1956). See generally Comment, Voting Trusts in
Texas, 12 Sw. L.J. 85 (1958).
See authorities cited in note 210 supra.
22 Grogan v. Grogan, 315 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), error ref. per curiam, 159 Tex.
392, 322 S.W.2d 514 (1959).
213159 Tex. 392, 322 S.W.2d 514 (1959).
...See Roberts v. Whitson, 188 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), error dismissed.
2'5 TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30B (Supp. 1968). Provision for the voting agreement
was made in the Act by amendment in 1961.
216 Id.




mal, and hence easier to establish, and there is no disruption in ownership.
But it must be admitted that voting trusts because of the transfer
of ownership are more certain and less likely to be upset.
Irrevocable Proxy. Generally speaking, a proxy is the right held by one
person to vote someone else's shares as the holder of the proxy may desire,
and in this respect, the proxy is somewhat akin to the general power of
attorney. When made irrevocable, the proxy becomes a useful device for
exercising control within the close corporation. By statute, no proxy is
valid more than eleven months from the date of its execution unless other-
wise stated in the proxy, and the proxy is revocable unless expressly pro-
vided therein to be irrevocable or unless otherwise made irrevocable by
law (i.e., being coupled with an interest)."'5 The phrase "coupled with an
interest" has been defined by a Texas appeals court in Roberts v. Whitson,"
in a negative vein when it declined to hold mutual promises contained in a
voting agreement as sufficient to uphold a shareholders' agreement. The case
is generally cited as representative of the restrictive view that the holder of
the proxy must have a property or financial interest in the stock itself
separate and distinct from the mere power to vote the shares; thus, a
creditor would clearly have such a separate financial interest." The more
liberal view provides that any property interest in the proxy holder for
which the stock is held for security is sufficient to render the proxy irre-
vocable even though the interest is not in the stock itself.2 ' This latter
interpretation is more consistent with economic realities for it recognizes
the voting rights as an element of the property right, which it certainly is.
But a corporate draftsman would be remiss if he relied on what the law
should be. Indeed, the Whitson case is not alone in indicating the Texas
courts' general reluctance to sanction restraints on alienation or freedom of
use. 2 Thus, utilizing the irrevocable proxy (other than in a shareholder
agreement) the cautious planner should insure that there is a separate finan-
cial interest apart from the stock. As this situation will seldom arise, the
use of the irrevocable proxy in Texas is probably negligible.
As indicated earlier, TBCA (article 2.30B) specifically validates voting
agreements, having been specifically enacted to overcome the Whitson
case .2  This section by granting enforcement in equity of voting agree-
ments seemingly validates irrevocable proxies contained therein even if
they only are supported by mutual promises, i.e., no separate, independent
consideration.
Other Control Devices. Requiring very high or unanimous shareholder or
2"9 TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.29C, as amended, (Supp. 1968). See generally Comment,
Irrevocable Proxies, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 733 (1965).
220 188 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), error ref. w.o.m.
221 See, e.g., C. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 144.04(3), at 229 (1969). Other cases
representative of this restrictive view are In re Chilson, 19 Del. Ch. 398, 168 A. 82 (Ch. 1933);
Areweld Mfg. Co. v. Burney, 12 Wash. 2d 212, 121 P.2d 350 (1942).
222 See, e.g., Deibler v. Chas. H. Elliott Co., 368 Pa. 267, 81 A.2d 557 (1951).
223 See, e.g., Sandor Petroleum Corp. v. Williams, 321 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), error
ref. n.r.e.; Grogan v. Grogan, 315 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).224 See Comment of Bar Committee, 3A Tnx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. 121 (1956).
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director approval in order to take action offers another control device.
However, the possibility of deadlock or stagnation of corporate action is
one disadvantage weighing against the establishment of high or unanimous
shareholder or director voting requirements. If such requirements are es-
tablished, provision for arbitration should also be made in the appropriate
corporate document (e.g., shareholder agreement, bylaws, etc.) in order
to avoid a deadlock. If an unbreakable deadlock should result, article 7.05
of the TBCA provides for the appointment of a receiver to rehabilitate
the corporation (a) when the directors are deadlocked in the management
of corporate affairs and the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock
and irreparable injury to the corporation is being suffered or is threatened,
and (b) when the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and have
failed for a period, including two annual meeting dates, to elect successors
to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired upon the
election and qualification of their successors. "
Placing restrictions on the transferability of shares also provides a means
for exercising control within the close corporation, especially in view of
the fact that such restrictions are usually designed to restrict the transfer
of shares to "outsiders," persons who have not previously participated in
the affairs of the corporation."'
V. CONCLUSION
No article could properly convey all of the possible variations and con-
siderations involved in incorporation planning. For this reason, and because
corporation statutes are essentially enabling legislation," ' the lawyer should
not simply rely on stock forms but rather should tailor each corporation to
the individual needs of his client. This is not to say that forms are not use-
ful, but merely that they are tools which the legal craftsman must use with
care and with recognition that each incorporation is a special, unique
product. The forms themselves are available in quantity, and the authors
have made no attempt to increase the supply here. What we have sought to
do is provide background information (including substantive detail)
which should assist the lawyer in selecting and preparing meaningful cor-
porate documents designed to carry out the wishes of his client efficiently
and accurately.2 s
22 See TEX. Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. art. 7.05A(1) (b), (e), as amended, (Supp. 1968).
.22 For a more detailed discussion of the restrictions on the transferability of shares, see text
accompanying notes 129-40 supra.
227 Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599
(1965).
228 The authors highly recommend the forms contained in A. BROMBERG, SUPPLEMENTARY MA-
TERIALS ON TEXAS CORPORATIONS (1965).
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